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CERTAINTY AND FINALITY ... I 
CERTAINTY AND FINALITY 
IN THE NISGA' A AGREEMENT 
JESSICA BOWERINGI 
ABSTRACT 
The 1998 Agreement between the Nisga'a people of Northern BC, 
the federal government, and the government of BC, is a treaty protected 
under s.35 of the Canadian Constitution. Existing s.35 jurisprudence 
allows treaties to be infringed by government so long as the government 
can justify the infringement under the Sparrow test. In the one signifi-
cant court case dealing with the Nisga'a Agreement, it was assumed that 
this jurisprudence applied. 
In this paper, the author argues that the Sparrow test ought not to be 
applied in the context of modem treaties such as the Nisga' a Agreement. 
Modem treaties, negotiated between equal parties in the light of Charter 
protection, should not be interpreted according to the special rules that 
have been developed for interpreting pre-Charter agreements. In order 
to achieve the reconciliation purpose of treaty making, modern treaties 
should be respected and courts should intervene as little as possible. On 
the express wording of the Nisga'a Agreement, the parties intended it to 
be a full and final settlement. The courts should give effect to that 
intention. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Nisga'a people of northern British Columbia have recently 
settled their claims with the governments of Canada and British Colum-
bia. The Agreement became effective on May 11, 2000. 1 It is a compre-
I Before coming to Dalhousie Law School, Jessica Bowering worked for a Member of the 
Legislative Assembly of B.C. She graduated from Simon Fraser University with a B.A. in 
Philosophy and Women's Studies, and will obtain her LLB in 2002. 
1 Nisga 'a Final Agreement, (Canada, British Columbia, Nisga'a Nation) August 4, 1998 
[hereinafter Agreement]. 
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hensive Agreement covering title to land, financial compensation, re-
source agreements, and self-government provisions. It is explicitly in-
tended to be a "treaty and a land claims agreement within the meaning of 
sections 25 and 3 5 of the Constitution Act, 1982, "2 to be binding on the 
parties,3 and to be a full and final settlement of the Nisga'a people's s.35 
rights.4 In this paper, I argue that, in order to achieve the purposes of 
treaty making, the courts should give effect to this intention. 
This argument begins with an exploration of the purposes of s.35, 
and how the Nisga'a Agreement fulfills these purposes. There have 
already been attempts to invalidate the Agreement in court.5 The politi-
cal atmosphere in British Columbia and experience with treaties in other 
2 Ibid. at c.2, s.1; Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K. ), 
1982, c.11, ss.25, 35 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982]. 
The text of s.25 reads: 
The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be 
construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other 
rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada includ-
ing 
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Procla-
mation of October 7, 1763; and 
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agree-
ments or may be so acquired. 
[hereinafter s. 25]. 
The text of s.35 reads: 
(I) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. 
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit 
and Metis peoples of Canada. 
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (I) "treaty rights" includes rights 
that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so 
acquired. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and 
treaty rights referred to in subsection (I) are guaranteed equally to 
male and female persons. 
[hereinafter s.35]. 
3 Agreement, supra note 1 at c.2, s.2. 
4 Ibid. at c.2, s.23 .. 
5 Campbell v. British Columbia (Attomey General), [2000] 189 D.L.R. (4tl') 333, 8 W.W.R. 
600 [hereinafter Campbell cited to DLR]; Nisga 'a Tribal Council v. Nisga 'a Tribal Council, 
[ 1998] B.C.J. No. 3254 (SC), aff' d [ 1998] B.C.J. No. 2395 (C.A); B. C. Citizens First Society 
v. British Columbia (AG), [1999] B.C.J. No. 120 (S.C.); B.C. Fisheries Survival Coalition v. 
Canada, [1999] B.C.J. No. 660 (S.C.). 
6 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at para. 62, 70 D.L.R. (4'") 385 [hereinafter Sparrow 
cited to S.C.R.]. 
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provinces, suggest that the Agreement will continue to be threatened by 
legal challenges. The purpose of s.35 requires that the Agreement be 
upheld and recognition and respect be given to the intentions of the 
parties as documented in the Agreement. The judicial responses to the 
legal challenges so far have been co1Tect in ultimately upholding the 
legality of the Agreement, but have unwisely imported the s.35 analysis 
that has been developed in the context of treaties pre-dating the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. Modem treaties deserve special consideration 
and protection under s.35. 
II. THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 35 
Recognition of Aboriginal rights, most notably in the Constitution 
Act, 1982, has created a dilemma for governments. Although most 
governments now willingly acknowledge that existing treaties between 
Aboriginal people and the Crown impose a moral obligation on both 
parties, governments are increasingly being forced to recognize that 
these obligations are legally enforceable. Governments must find a way 
to meet those obligations in the context of a myriad of other obligations 
and commitments to non-Aboriginals, many of which may be incompat-
ible with the rights of Aboriginal people. For example, an Aboriginal 
band may lay claim to land that is cun-ently owned, lived on, or worked 
on, by non-Aboriginal people. These conflicts may also arise in relation 
to Aboriginal claims to parkland, or lands subject to resource extraction 
agreements. Detem1ining and enforcing Aboriginal rights without con-
sidering these factors would cause chaos. On the other hand, Aboriginal 
rights exist, and they have gone unrecognized for far too long; Aborigi-
nal people are entitled to have their rights recognized in theory, but also 
recognised and respected in concrete form. They are not responsible for 
the competing interests of non-Aboriginals, and should not have their 
rights abrogated simple because they conflict with those of non-Aborigi-
nal Canadians. 
The courts have recognized this dilemma and have been loathe to 
make unqualified declarations of Aboriginal rights for fear of upsetting 
the balance between competing interests. Rather, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has been careful to make clear that the Aboriginal rights recog-
4 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
nized by s.35 are qualified by Crown sovereignty. In Sparrow, the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that, 
rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. Federal 
legislative powers continue ... These powers must, however, now be 
read together with s.35(1). In other words, federal power must be 
reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconcili-
ation is to demand the justification of any government regulation that 
infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights. 6 
In R v. Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer (as he then was) said the 
purpose of s.35 was to "provide the constitutional framework through 
which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, 
with their own practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and 
reconciled with the sovereignty of the Crown." Further, he stated that 
"[t]he substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined 
in light of this purpose."7 Clearly, the Supreme Court of Canada is of the 
view that Aboriginal rights are to be defined by balancing the rights of 
Aboriginal people and the sovereignty of the Crown. In cases where 
Aboriginal rights and Crown sovereignty conflict, it is the courts who 
must decide how the balance should be struck. 
In finding this balance, the courts have also made it clear that 
negotiation is preferable to litigation. In its unanimous judgement in 
Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada held s.35(1) provides" a solid 
constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take 
place."8 In Van der Peet, s.35 was called a "constitutional framework for 
reconciliation."9 Perhaps the clearest direction from the comi on the 
issue of negotiation came in Delgamuukw: 
[T]he Crown is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into and 
conduct those negotiations in good faith. Ultimately, it is through 
negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides, 
reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I 
stated in Van der Peet ... to be a basic purpose of s.35( 1) - "the 
6 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at para. 62, 70 D.L.R. (4'11 ) 385 [hereinafter Sparrow 
cited to S.C.R.]. 
7 R v. Van der Peet, [ 1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 31, 137 D.L.R. ( 4'11) 289 [hereinafter Van der 
Peet cited to S.C.R.]. 
8 Sparrow, supra note 6 at para. 53. 
9 Van der Peet, supra note 7 at para. 42. 
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reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the 
sovereignty of the Crown". Let us face it, we are all here to stay. 10 
Section 35 has always been intended to be defined through negotia-
tion and compromise. Section 35 was added at the same time as was 
s.37, which originally called for one conference on the topic of "consti-
tutional matters that directly affect the aboriginal people of Canada" and 
was amended to include three additional conferences. I I Although ulti-
mately unsuccessful, the "primary purpose of these conferences was 
... to identify and define Aboriginal and treaty rights."I 2 Subsequent 
jurisprudence has given s.35 some meaning in the absence of constitu-
tional amendments, but it has also confirmed that the content of s.35 can 
better be defined through negotiation and agreement. 
The jurisprudence could have gone a different way. lfthe purpose of 
s.35 was only "the recognition of the prior occupation of North America 
by aboriginal peoples"13 or some other formulation that recognized 
Aboriginal rights as truly inherent, there would be no basis for Crown 
limitation of those rights, and no need to negotiate with the Crown in 
order to give definition to those rights. Arguably, there would be no 
basis for the assertion of Crown sovereignty in the first place, given that 
the Constitution "provides no historical context or justification for the 
assumption that Canada exists."I4 In theory this is a supportable inter-
pretation of s.35, but its practical implications are so drastic that it 
appears never to have been seriously considered by the Supreme Comi 
of Canada. The argument in this paper - that governments should not be 
able to infringe the s.35 rights that have been defined by the Nisga'a 
Agreement (and by other post-1982 agreements) - is based on the 
premises that one of the purposes of s.35 is reconciliation, and that 
treaties are a recognized way to define s.35 rights in lieu of a constitu-
tional agreement. 
10 Delgamuukiv v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para. 182, 153 D.L.R. (4tll) 193 
[hereinafter Delganwukw cited to S.C.R.]. 
11 M. Asch, "Aboriginal Self-Government and the Construction of Canadian Constitutional 
Identity" ( 1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. (No. 2) 465 at 475, online: QL (JOUR). 
12 Ibid. at 475. 
13 R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 at para. 72, 137 D.L.R. (4'h) 468 [hereinafter Gladstone 
cited to S.C.R.]. 
14 Asch, supra note 11 at 474. 
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III. INTERPRETING THE NISGA' A AGREEMENT 
1. The Purpose of the Nisga'a Agreement 
The Crown colony of British Columbia refused to recognize Ab-
original rights, and, up until 1991, B.C. refused to participate in the 
treaty process. The Nisga'a people had been diligently pursuing their 
claim for over a hundred years when the B.C. government finally came 
to the negotiating table. In 1885, three Nisga'a chiefs traveled to Ottawa 
to meet with Prime Minister John A. MacDonald. In 1886, the Nisga'a 
refused to allow land surveying by provincial crews and began an 
organized process to support their claim. They traveled to the Legisla-
ture in Victoria in 1887 and were refused entry to the building. In 1907, 
they created the Nisga'a Land Committee and initiated an unsuccessful 
petition for recognition to the Privy Council. There was a period of 
relative inactivity between 1927 and 1951 when the Indian Act prohib-
ited raising money for the purpose of pursuing land claims. Finally, in 
1969 the Nisga' a brought a court action claiming Aboriginal title to their 
ancestral land. In Calder v. A.G. of B.C., 15 the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada recognized the existence of Aboriginal title, although 
the Court did not recognize the Nisga'a claim in this case. 16 Following 
the Calder decision, the Federal government began negotiations with 
the Nisga'a. In 1991 B.C. agreed to participate.17 
The Nisga'a have been seeking an agreement with the Crown for a 
long time. Primarily they have sought recognition of their right to their 
land. Ancillary to this they have been seeking recognition of their 
inherent right to self-government, and a mechanism for exercising that 
right, as well as guaranteed access to resources and economic opportuni-
ties. They also wanted financial compensation for the loss of their land 
and for the historic suppression of their rights. To make the process 
meaningful, it was critical that these rights be guaranteed and that the 
15 [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3"1) 145 [hereinafter Calder cited to S.C.R.]. 
16 Three of the seven judges held that the Nisga'a Aboriginal title had been extinguished and 
one judge declined to determine the issue. 
17 T.R. Berger, "The Importance of the Nisga'a Treaty to Canadians" (C01Ty Lecture, Queen's 
University, Kingston, Ontario, October 2, 1999)], online: The People of the Nass Valley 
<www.ntc.bc.ca/speeches/berger2.html> (date accessed: February 6, 2001); D. Sanders, " 
'We Intend to Live Here Forever': A Primer on the Nisga'a Treaty" (1999) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 
103. 
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Nisga'a people be able to pursue economic and community develop-
ment with security and certainty. These goals have all been recognized 
in the Agreement, although the Nisga'a people have certainly not gotten 
everything that they wanted. 18 
In order for the Nisga'a Agreement to effect true reconciliation 
between the Nisga'a and the Crown, it must reflect the goals of all the 
parties. Reconciliation requires that the treaty be understood and re-
spected by the non-Native population, as well as the Nisga'a people. In 
the wake of the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in 
MacMillan Bloedel v. Mullin, which held that Aboriginal title is an 
encumberance on Crown rights to forested land, 19 it has become widely 
accepted in B.C. that there is investment uncertainty in logging activity 
on land claimed by Aboriginals. "If MacMillan Bloedel [now 
Weyerhaeuser], the largest forest company in the province, can be 
stopped from exercising logging rights that they hold under provincial 
law, it is not business as usual."20 Resolving this problem of uncertainty 
in land claims is an important priority for non-native governments. 
The Provincial and Federal Governments have made their goals in 
treaty negotiations very clear. The B.C. Treaty Commission says that 
treaties are designed to achieve reconciliation, certainty, reduced con-
flict, and constitutional protection. 21 In promotional materials, both the 
B.C. and Federal Governments have emphasized certainty and reduced 
conflict, among other things, as the benefits of treaties. From the per-
spective of non-Aboriginal governments, establishing with certainty 
their legal and ethical obligation is key to stability in government 
planning, and serving private-sector investment. 
Thomas Berger22 described the consequences of British Columbia's 
failure to enter into treaties with First Nations as "hostility, uncertainty, 
mistrust and a multitude oflawsuits."23 These are the problems to which 
the parties are responding in the Nisga'a Agreement; the Agreement is 
one step toward achieving the final goals of finality and certainty. 
18 The People of the Nass Valley, online <www.ntc.bc.ca> (date accessed: February 6, 2001). 
1" Haida Nation v. B.C., [1997] 153 D.L.R. (41h) I, 98 B.C.A.C. 42 (C.A.). 
20 Sanders, supra note 17 at para. I 0. 
21 What Will Treaties Accomplish?, online: B.C. Treaty Commission <www.bctreaty.net/ 
miscellany/trbk-what.html> (date accessed: April 16, 200 I). 
22 The lawyer who argued Calder, supra note 15 on behalf of the Nisga'a. 
23 Berger, supra note 17. 
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Moreover, as the B.C. Treaty Commission puts it, the purpose of the 
Nisga'a Agreement is "to establish a new relationship based on mutual 
respect, trust, and understanding."24 
2. The Relationship Between s. 35 and the Nisga'a Agreement 
Peter Hogg has said that the Nisga'a people "already have constitu-
tionally entrenched rights as aboriginal rights, so this [the Agreement] is 
substituting one set ofrights for another." He says that the treaty should 
be seen as a formal recognition of existing rights protected by s. 35.25 
This is an endorsement of the idea that the Agreement does not add to 
the s. 35 rights of the Nisga'a, but rather defines and delineates the 
existing rights. What the Nisga'a already had was underdetermined, 
since it was dependent on a judicial statement of their rights and of the 
extent of the Crown's ability to infringe those rights. This has been 
replaced by the Agreement, which represents a comprehensive and 
binding compromise between the parties. 
This is not to say that the Nisga'a Agreement simply defines rights 
the Nisga'a could have otherwise won in court. There is no way to know 
with any certainty how a court would have interpreted existing Nisga'a 
rights. For example, consistent with federal (and provincial) negotiating 
policy,26 the Nisga'a Agreement recognizes at least a limited form of 
inherent self-government. This may well go beyond what the courts 
would have recognized had the matter been litigated. In R. v. 
Pamajewon, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the same legal 
standard applies to self-government as would apply to any other Ab-
original right.27 This makes it very difficult to establish a right to self-
government, given the test laid out in Van der Peet in which the first step 
is to specifically characterize the right claimed without reference to the 
significance of the right. 28 Arguably, an Aboriginal group would have to 
24 B.C. Treaty Commission, supra note 22. 
25 "Nisga'a deal doesn't require referendum" The Vancouver Sun (July 30, 1998) online: 
<www.bc-mining-house.com/news/vs_30g98.htm> (accessed February 6, 2001 ). 
26 Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Aboriginal Self-Government: The Government 
of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of 
Aboriginal Self-Government (Federal Policy Guide) (Ottawa, 1995), online: Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada <www.inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html> (date accessed: February 
6, 200l)[hereinafter Federal Policy Guide]. 
27 R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 82lat para. 24, 138 D.L.R. (4'h) 204. 
28 Van der Peet, supra note 7. 
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establish an Aboriginal right "for each and every head of jurisdiction it 
wishes to exercise"29 using this test. 
In contrast, the Agreement gives content to the protected s. 35 rights, 
regardless of how the courts might have interpreted them otherwise. It is 
a basic principle of treaty law that "nations may impose on themselves 
obligations where none existed before"30 and "[n]egotiations among 
governments and Aboriginal peoples are clearly preferable as the most 
practical and effective way to implement the inherent right of self-
government."31 Section 35 protects the rights enumerated in treaties 
regardless of whether they would otherwise have been deemed protected 
Aboriginal rights. 
3. The Content of the Nisga'a Agreement Demonstrates the Intent 
of the Parties 
As I have established, a final and certain dete1mination of rights is a 
key purpose of the Agreement for all the parties. This is clear from the 
history of the negotiations and from the motives leading the parties to 
negotiate. It is also clear from the terms of the treaty itself. The Chapter 
on General Provisions contains a number of references to finality: 
specifically, the Agreement states it is binding on the parties;32 prevails 
over the provisions of any federal or provincial law in the event of an 
inconsistency or conflict;33 permits no party to challenge or support a 
challenge to the validity of any provision of the Agreement, 34 and 
requires the agreement of all parties to amend the Agreement.35 There 
are also a number of provisions that make it clear that the Agreement 
exhaustively defines the Aboriginal rights of the Nisga'a people36, in-
cluding exhaustively setting out the s.35 rights of the Nisga'a people.37 
29 B.W. Morse, "Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R. 
v. Pamajewon" ( 1997) 42 McGill L.J. 1011 at I 036. 
30 J. [Sakej] Youngblood Henderson, "Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties" (1997) 36 Alta. L. 
Rev. (No. I) 46 at 49 online: QL (JOUR). 
31 Federal Policy Guide, supra note 27. 
32 Agreement, supra note 1 at c. 2, s. 2. 
33 Ibid. at c. 2, s. 13. 
34 Ibid. at c. 2, s. 20. 
35 Ibid. at c. 2, s. 36. 
36 Ibid. at c. 2, ss. 22-27 
37 Ibid. at c. 2, s. 23. 
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The parties would have been aware of the Sparrow justification test 
as they negotiated the Agreement.38 The Sparrow test, which was ex-
panded in Badger to include treaty rights,39 allows s.35 rights to be 
infringed if the government can justify the infringement. That is, the 
government must demonstrate a valid legislative objective and show 
that the infringement is consistent with the honour of the Crown, includ-
ing the obligations to consult the affected people, to ensure as little 
infringement of the right as possible, and to provide compensation.40 
Yet, rather then allow the Agreement to be infringed so long as the 
infringements could be justified on that standard, the parties choose to 
give the Agreement internal limitations and justificatory standards. The 
internal limitations and standards serve the purposes of the parties in a 
more tailored way than the all-purpose Sparrow test. The Sparrow test is 
therefore redundant to resolving disputes arising out of the agreement. 
Whereas the Sparrow test makes federal and provincial laws para-
mount where the paramountcy can be justified, the Agreement specifies 
which laws will be paramount under paiiicular heads of power. Federal 
or provincial law will prevail in areas such as public order, peace and 
safety,41 traffic and transportation,42 provision of social services,43 health 
services,44 and emergency preparedness.45 The government may inter-
vene in these areas without meeting any justificatory standards, presum-
ably because these are areas where the public interest is most pressing. 
In other areas, Nisga'a laws are paramount, provided that they meet or 
exceed provincial or federal standards, or receive provincial or federal 
approval. Such areas include child and family services,46 Aboriginal 
healers,47 adoption,48 police services,49 and court services.50 In these 
38 Sparrow was decided in 1990 and the Nisga'a Agreement in Principle was concluded in 
1996. 
39 R. v. Badger, [1996] I S.C.R. 771at para. 73, 133 D.L.R. (4'11) 324 [hereinafter Badger cited 
to S.C.R.]. 
40 This is not an exhaustive list of justification criteria. Sparrow, supra note 6 at para. 83. 
41 Agreement, supra note 1 at c.11, s.62. 
42 Ibid. at c.11, s.74. 
43 Ibid. at c. 11, s. 79. 
44 Ibid. at c.11, s.83. 
45 Ibid. at c.11, s.123. 
46 Ibid. at c.11, s.91 
47 Ibid. at c.11, s.86. 
48 Ibid. at c.11, s.96. 
49 Ibid. at c.12, s.4. 
50 Ibid. at c.12, s.34. 
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areas, government can only intervene where its law sets a higher stan-
dard than that set by Nisga'a law. Finally, there are areas of core cultural 
imp01iance where Nisga'a laws are paramount without any ability for 
provincial and federal intervention.51 
The Sparrow test, as it been expanded in subsequent jurisprudence, 52 
outlines the types of objectives that will be sufficient to justify infringe-
ment. Instead of relying on the operation of Sparrow, the Agreement 
makes clear the objectives that can justify limitation in specific areas. 
The only objective explicitly deemed relevant to fishing rights in the 
Agreement, 53 and in Sparrow, is conservation.54 The Agreement goes 
further than what was contemplated in Sparrow, and makes fishing 
rights subject to "legislation enacted for the purposes of public health or 
public safety."55 Nisga'a law in relation to forest resources must include 
"forest standards that meet or exceed forest standards established under 
forest practices legislation applicable to Crown land."56 The Nisga'a are 
required to make laws that meet the standards the federal or provincial 
government dete1mine are in the public interest. The limits in the 
agreement are generally consistent with the Sparrow test, but where 
there is a difference, the parties must be taken to have intended that 
difference. 
The Nisga'a Agreement as a whole, with its detailed description of 
the rights of the Nisga'a people, including the limits on those rights, and 
its express statements of finality, makes it clear that the paiiies intended 
the Agreement to be a full and final determination of both Nisga'a right 
under s.35 and government's ability to affect those rights. 
4. The Effect of Party Intentions on the Government's Ability to 
Infringe the Agreement 
One might argue that the actual intentions of the paiiies in negotiat-
ing the Agreement are not relevant in determining whether the Agree-
ment can be infringed. After all, the Constitution is the "supreme law of 
51 See for example Ibid. at c.11, s.40 (Nisga 'a Citizenship), s 41 (Culture and Language) and 
s.115 (devolution of cultural property) 
52 See for example Gladstone, supra note 13; Badger supra note 40. 
53 Agreement, supra note I at c.8, s. l (a) 
54 Sparrow, supra note 6 at para. 73. 
55 Agreement, supra note 1 at c 8, s.1 (b ). 
56 Ibid. at c.5, s 8. 
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Canada"57 and the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted the Consti-
tution as allowing governments to infringe treaties so long as they can 
meet the justificatory standard set out in Sparrow. This argument is 
based on a misunderstanding of what is necessary to create a workable 
treaty. Treaties are explicitly recognized by s. 35, and the courts have 
called on the parties to give effect to s.35 rights through treaties. There-
fore, s.35 must create and protect the tools necessary to make and 
enforce treaties. Those tools include the power to make treaties that 
achieve the goals of the parties, including certainty and finality. 
Treaties are, by definition, compromises: each party gets some of 
what they want and neither party gets everything they want. If one party 
has the power to unilaterally shift this balance and, if the intentions of all 
parties are not relevant in determining what is protected, then a treaty 
does not "establish a new relationship based on mutual respect, trust, 
and understanding."58 Section 35, as the courts have interpreted it, 
requires that the treaty process have credibility. The credibility of the 
treaty process requires that the intentions of the parties in negotiating 
agreements be respected. Berger put the issue this way: 
It is unrealistic to think that, ifthe Nisga'a Treaty is scuttled, it will be 
possible to negotiate with First Nations in this province. You can't tear 
up a document painfully arrived at after 20 years of negotiation, and 
expect the Nisga 'a to negotiate for another 20 years. 
If we reject the Nisga'a treaty, the goodwill that has been won, the 
treaty process that is under way, the steps towards reconciliation that 
have been taken - all will be lost in a welter of hostility and recrimina-
tion.59 
It has been argued more generally that it is inappropriate60 to apply the 
Sparrow test to treaties at all. 
The solemn nature of treaties as representative of the agreements made 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples and their existence as 
57 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2 at s.52( I) The text of this section reads: 
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or 
effect. 
58 B.C. Treaty Commission, supra note 22. 
59 Berger, supra note 17. 
60 Especially when the range of objectives that can serve to justify infringements is broadened 
beyond conservations as it was in Gladstone, supra note 13. 
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negotiated compacts suggest that any attempt to abrogate the rights 
contained within them ought to be subject to a more onerous test than 
that applied to Aboriginal rights. 61 
The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly rejected this argument.62 
However, the argument is stronger in the context of modem treaties that 
are evidently intended to be an exhaustive description of the rights and 
obligations of the parties. There is an opportunity for courts to distin-
guish previous case law on this basis. At a minimum, there must be a 
recognition that the parties intended it to be very difficult, if not impos-
sible, to unilaterally alter the terms of the Agreement. 
IV. THREATS To THE AGREEMENT 
1. Campbell v. Attorney-General of British Columbia 
Shortly after the Agreement was signed it was challenged in court by 
then Leader of the B.C. Liberal Party and now Premier ofB.C., Gordon 
Campbell. The B.C. Supreme Court rejected the claim.63 At the time Mr. 
Campbell declared an intention to appeal the decision, 64 although since 
being elected Premier he has dropped the appeal in favour of holding a 
provincial referendum on treaty negotiations in general. 
The political context of the comi challenge makes the threat particu-
larly interesting. Although the argument failed in court, there is obvi-
ously political will to undermine the Agreement. The window for gov-
ernment intervention that s.35 jurisprudence has left open is of particular 
concern in this context. 
In Campbell, the plaintiffs made three arguments. First, they argued 
that ss.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 186765 create an exhaustive 
division of legislative power, and therefore, the legislative jurisdiction 
granted to the Nisga'a people by the Agreement is inconsistent with the 
61 L.I. Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow 
Justificatory Test" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. (No. 1) 149 at 168, online: QL (JOUR). 
62 Badger, supra note 40. R v. Cote, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, 138 D.L.R. (4'11) 385. 
6) Campbell, supra note 5. 
64 B.C. Liberals, Press Release "Nisga'a Judgment to be Appealed" (July 24, 2000) online: 
<www .bcliberals.com/news/newsarchive/news0724001.htm> (date accessed: Febmary 6, 
2001). 
65 Constitution, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, s. 91, 
92 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867]. 
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Constitution. Justice Williamson considered the preamble to the Consti-
tution Act, 1867, which "invites the use of. .. organizing principles to fill 
out the gaps in the express terms of the constitutional scheme"66 and 
found that it provides recognition of the diminished form of self-govern-
ment that was recognized by British Imperial policy. He found that the 
purpose of the federal-provincial division of powers was "not to extin-
guish diversity (or aboriginal rights). "67 He also considered the finding 
in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band that "[f]rom the aboriginal perspec-
tive, any federal-provincial divisions that the Crown has imposed on 
itself are internal to itself and do not alter the basic structure of Sover-
eign-Indian relations."68 Justice Williamson concluded that "after the 
assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown, and continuing to and 
after the time of Confederation, although the right of aboriginal people 
to govern themselves was diminished, it was not extinguished. "69 
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Williamson relied on the 
proposition in Sparrmv and Badger that the Crown retains the right to 
infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights, "subject to its ability to justify 
such interference in a manner consistent with the honour of the 
Crown."70 According to the court, this limitation on treaty rights "is an 
answer to the submission that the constitutional entrenchment of the 
Nisga'a Treaty amounts to a permanent abdication by Parliament of its 
right to interfere with decisions of the Nisga'a Lisims Government 
taking into account the impact of those decisions upon the greater public 
good."71 
The second argument made by the plaintiffs in Campbell was that 
since the Nisga'a Agreement pennits laws that do not require assent 
from either the Governor General or the Lieutenant Governor, it is a 
violation of the principle of Royal Assent, set out in s. 55 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867.72 The plaintiffs relied on a statement in re The 
66 Campbell supra note 5 at para. 66, citing Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the 
Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 69. 
67 Ibid. at para. 78. 
68 Ibid. at para. 80, citing [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 108-9. 
69 Ibid. at para. 179. 
70 Ibid. at para. 121. 
71 Ibid. at para. 128. 
72 Constitution Act, I 867, supra note 66 at s.55. The text of the section reads: 
Where a Bill passed by the Houses of the Parliament is presented to the 
Governor General for the Queen's Assent, he shall declare, according to 
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Initiatives and Referendum Act, that while a legislature can delegate 
legislation 
"... it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own 
capacity a new legislative power not created by the British North 
America Act to which it owes its own existence."73 
This statement was obiter, but the Supreme Court of Canada has said 
that 
"it may stand for the wider proposition that the power of constitutional 
amendment given to the provinces by s.92(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1867 does not necessarily comprise the power to bring about a pro-
found constitutional upheaval by the introduction of political institu-
tions foreign to and incompatible with the Canadian system."74 
Justice Williamson distinguished the Nisga'a Agreement from the 
kind of "profound constitutional upheaval" envisioned by that case by 
pointing out that the powers granted to the Nisga'a are limited both by 
the internal terms of the treaty and by the limited promise of s.35, 
meaning that s.35 protects treaties subject to justified government in-
fringement. He also pointed out that the wording of s.55 does not "on its 
wording apply to other [non Parliamentary] law making bodies."75 How-
ever, in responding to both this and the previous argument about divi-
sion of powers, he relied heavily on the fact that the Nisga'a powers are 
limited and therefore not an undue abrogation of Parliamentary author-
ity. 
The final argument made by the petitioners is that the Agreement 
violates s.3 of the Charter,76 which provides the right to vote in elections 
for the House of Commons or the Legislative Assembly. Justice 
Williamson dealt with this point summarily, pointing out that the rights 
his Discretion, but subject to the Provisions of this Act and to Her 
Majesty's Instructions, either that he assents thereto in the Queen's Name, 
or that he withholds the Queen's Assent, or that he reserves the Bill for the 
Signification of the Queen's Pleasure. 
73 Campbell, supra note 5 at para. 147 citing [ 1919] A.C. 935 (J.C.P.C.) at 945. 
74 Ibid. at para. 148 citing OP SEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), [ 1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 at 4 7. 
75 Ibid. at para. 150. 
76 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 
2 at s.3. The text of this section reads: 
Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of 
the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for 
membership therein. 
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guaranteed by s.3 are limited to the House of Commons and the Legisla-
tive Assembly. As well, he found that s.25, 77 which protects treaty rights 
from abrogation by the Charter, provides a complete defence to this 
argument. 
In the final analysis, Justice Williamson rejected each of the argu-
ments that would have invalidated the Agreement. He says that "what 
Canada, British Columbia and the Nisga'a have achieved in the Nisga'a 
Final Agreement is consistent both with what the Supreme Court of 
Canada has encouraged, and consistent with the purpose of s.35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982."78 However, I believe that by relying on the 
ability of the Crown to infringe s.35, he actually provided the opening 
for "what the Supreme Court of Canada has encouraged" and "the 
purpose of s.35" to be undermined. As I have outlined above, Justice 
Williamson had an alternate ground for rejecting each argument that the 
Nisga'a Agreement is unconstitutional. He did not need to rely on the 
idea that s.35 provides limited protection. Any limits on the rights of 
Aboriginal people that are constitutionally required in order to reconcile 
those rights with Crown sovereignty are provided by the limitations that 
the parties have chosen and are already included within the framework 
of the Nisga'a Agreement. 
Interestingly, the Nisga'a Nation accepted, for the purposes of the 
Campbell proceedings, that the Nisga'a Agreement was negotiated "in 
full knowledge of the limited effect. .. of the constitutional promise of 
s.35."79 Most likely, in the context of the dispute, this was not seen as the 
most effective or appropriate battle. Alternatively, the ability of govern-
ments to infringe treaty rights may have become so entrenched in 
Canadian jurisprudence that it did not occur to the Nisga'a Nation (or 
their counsel) to question it. It is a premise that has been simply assumed 
in the limited Canadian judicial and academic pronouncements on the 
subject.80 Nonetheless, it remains a premise open to serious question. 
2. Experience with Other Agreements 
The experience of other First Nations with modern land claims 
agreements further suggests that those who are concerned with the 
77 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2 at s. 25. 
78 Campbell, supra note 5 at para. 171. 
79 Ibid. at para. 182. 
80 See for example Sanders, supra note 17 at para. 56. 
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success of the treaty process in achieving good will, certainty, trust and 
an end to litigation have reason to be concerned. The 1975 James Bay 
and Northern Quebec Agreement81 is the longest standing "modem" 
treaty.82 The self-government rights in the JBNQA are much more 
limited then those in the Nisga'a agreement. It was primarily intended to 
be an agreement dealing with rights to land and resource development. 
In spite of its differences, it provides some insight into the problems that 
can arise throughout the life of an agreement, despite the best intentions 
of the parties at the time of entering the agreement. 
The federal and Quebec governments have a "reputation [of] being 
unable and unwilling to implement" the terms of the JBNQA. 83 The 
Quebec government has taken the position that it maintains unilateral 
control over native self-government84 and has used the JBNQA to sup-
port its argument that the claims of other Aboriginal people have been 
extinguished. 85 This assertion of unilateral power over a negotiated 
agreement, as well as the pitting of one Aboriginal group against an-
other, has continued to breed mistrnst. 86 The result of this mistrnst is that 
the Cree87 "have been in court virtually every year over the past twenty 
years to defend their rights and ensure their just entitlements."88 
This is precisely the kind of result that should be avoided. As I have 
already discussed , and as the courts have repeatedly pointed out, it is not 
in anyone's best interest to have continued litigation over Aboriginal 
rights. The JBNQA is a cautionary tale. It tells us that, over the long 
81 An Act approving the Agreement conceming James Bay and Northern Quebec, S.Q. 1976, c. 
46 [hereinafter JBNQA]. 
82 M. Smith., "Memorandum Re: The Nisga'a Land Claim Agreement" (July 31, 1998), online: 
B.C. Liberal Home Page <http://www.bcliberals.com/policy/partypolicy/nisgaa/ 
memorand.shtml> (date accessed: Feb. 6, 2001 ); P. Joffe, "Assessing the Delgamuukw 
Principles: National Implications and Potential Effects on Quebec" (2000) 45 McGill L. J. 
155. 
8J T. Isaac, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: The Nunavut Agreement in Principle and 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982" (1992) 21 Man. L. J. 390 at 396, online: QL 
(JOUR). 
84 Smith, supra note 83; G. St. Louis, "The Tangled Web of Sovereignty and Self-Governance: 
Canada's Obligation to the Cree Nation in Consideration of Quebec's Threats to Secede" 
( 1996) 14 Berkeley Journal oflnternational Law 380, online: WL (JLR). 
85 Joffe, supra note 83 at para. 56. 
86 Ibid. at para. 57. 
87 The Inuit have been much less involved in the litigation. Ibid. at para. 70. 
88 Ibid. 
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term, we cannot simply rely on the good faith of the parties involved to 
enforce an agreement. It must be given legally enforceable protection 
against threats that may arise in the future, as governments and priorities 
change. In addition, it tells us that that protection must be clear and 
unequivocal to prevent a litany oflitigation as parties continue to test the 
limits. 
The Quebec position is unique, and it could be argued that other 
governments will not behave in the same way. For example, Quebec has 
"repeatedly asserted that it will develop the Cree Nation territory at its 
own sovereign discretion" and that a referendum on the Cree's right to 
determine their own future will not be recognized. 89 The Quebec govern-
ment has taken the position that in a secessionist Quebec, Quebec will be 
able to assume the obligations of the federal government and subject 
treaties to a new Quebec Constitution. This result was never negotiated 
and is an example of the kind of unilateral assertion of power that has 
bred uncertainty and mistrust.90 It does not necessarily apply in other 
provmces. 
However, all governments are concerned with maintaining, and in 
many cases increasing, their legislative authority. The provincial and 
federal governments are consistently involved in jurisdictional disputes 
with each other.91 In many of these cases, these disputes arise from 
legitimate and sincere disagreements as to how the needs of Canadians 
as federal and provincial citizens are best served. Is there any reason to 
think that these same kinds of disputes will not arise between provincial/ 
federal governments and the Nisga' a government? They may not arise in 
the same political context as in Quebec, but it is likely that they will arise 
nonetheless. The difference is that, if the existing s.35 jurisprudence is 
applied, provincial and federal governments will potentially be able to 
argue that the assertion of their laws is in the broader public interest and 
therefore unilaterally infringe the jurisdictional agreements found in the 
Agreement, rather then being forced to stay within their constitutional 
jurisdiction. 92 
89 St. Louis, supra note 85 at 384. 
90 Joffe, supra note 83. 
91 See for example 41 st Annual Premiers Conference, News Release, (August 10, 2000), 
online: <www.scics.gc.ca/cinfo00/850080012 _ e.html> (date accessed: April 16, 200 I); West-
ern Premiers' Conference '99, News Release, (May 21, 1999), online: <www.aeda.gov.ab.ca/ 
premier/premconf99/news _comm_may2 l.cfm> (date accessed: April 16, 200 I). 
CERTAINTY AND FINALITY ... 19 
3. Nisga'a Assertions of New Rights 
Thus far, I have considered only the consequences of infringements 
by non-Aboriginal governments. It is this kind of infringement that is 
contemplated by the s.35 jurisprudence and specifically by the Supreme 
Court of B.C. in Campbell. Such infringement would violate the express 
terms of the Nisga'a Agreement. For example, s.13 of the Agreement 
states that the Agreement prevails over any federal or provincial law to 
the extent of any inconsistency and s.36 provides that amendments to 
the Agreement may be made only with the consent of all three parties. 
Presumably the argument that provincial and federal governments can 
unilaterally infringe is based on s.52 of the Constitution.93 That is, s.35 is 
part of the "supreme law of Canada." If s.35, properly interpreted, 
allows infringement, then this takes priority over the contrary terms of 
the Agreement. 
It must, however, be recognized that the Nisga'a can potentially use 
the same argument. The Agreement says that it "exhaustively sets out 
Nisga'a section 35 rights, the geographic extent of those rights, and the 
limitations to those rights."94 As the jurisprudence evolves, it seems 
likely that other Aboriginal groups will be successful in having previ-
ously unrecognized rights recognized under s.35. Some of these may 
well be rights that, in the absence of an Agreement, the Nisga'a would 
have been in a position to claim. For example, if an Aboriginal right not 
to pay taxes or at least not to pay taxes in certain circumstances were 
recognized,95 the Nisga'a would be barred from claiming such a right by 
the Agreement, which states that the Nisga'a will lose their income tax 
exemption.96 The court could also have made a specific finding about an 
Aboriginal right to a share in the fishery that surpassed the share that is 
provided for in the Agreement.97 These findings would not automati-
92 The range of valid objectives was broadened in Gladstone, supra note 13 at para. 73 to 
include infringement for objectives which are "of compelling and substantial importance to 
that community as a whole." 
93 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2 at s.52: 
94 Agreement, supra note 1 at c.2, s.23. 
95 In Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1999] I F.C. 375, 167 D.L.R. (4'11) 
702, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 3, the Federal Court of Appeal 
found an Aboriginal right not to pay customs taxes. 
96 Agreement, supra note 1 at c.16, s.6. 
97 Agreement, supra note I at Schedules A and B. 
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cally apply to the Nisga'a, since Aboriginal rights are specific to the 
group claiming,98 but the only thing preventing the Nisga'a from claim-
ing them would be the terms of the Agreement. However, if s.35 protects 
those rights, then, according to the logic employed in the argument for 
government infringement, that protection should take priority over the 
terms of the Agreement. The Nisga' a should be able to seek a judicial 
declaration of what rights are included in s.35 and enforce those rights as 
a matter of constitutional law, despite the fact that they are not included 
in the Agreement. 
The result of such an argument is uncertain. A court might well limit 
the Nisga'a to their Agreement, despite the fact that provincial and 
federal governments are not so limited. For example, a court might say 
that the government right to infringe treaties was paii of s.35 before the 
existence of the Nisga'a treaty, while the hypothetical new s.35 rights of 
the Nisga'a were not. This argument is specious in that the law is 
supposed to exist independently of judicial pronouncements on the 
subject.99 Neve1iheless, this, or some other ground, might well be used 
to deny the Nisga'a claim. The result of any such claim is uncertain. 
Certainty and an end to litigation are undermined by the very possibility 
of these kinds of claims being successful. 
v. THE UNIQUE POSITION OF MODERN AGREEMENTS 
1. Canadian Principles of Interpretation 
Crown sovereignty implies a Crown right to infringe Aboriginal and 
treaty rights. 100 In order to balance this with the prior occupation of 
Aboriginal people, the courts have developed generous principles of 
interpretation to protect Aboriginal people. A fiduciary responsibility 
has also been imposed on the Crown to prevent it from entering into 
unfair or exploitative agreements with Aboriginal people. 101 These prin-
ciples have largely been formulated in the context of either undocu-
98 Van der Peet, supra note 7 at para. 69. 
99 See for example Reference re Language Rights, [1992] l S.C.R. 212, 88 D.L.R. (4'h) 385; R 
v. Campbell & Mly11archuk, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 246, IO C.C.C. (2d) 26. 
100 Sparrow, supra note 6. 
101 See for example Guerin v. Canada, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (41h) 321; Ibid. 
CERTAINTY AND FINALITY ... 21 
mented Aboriginal rights or treaties that were created in a context of 
extreme power imbalance. Rightly, the courts have been protective of 
First Nations and have sought out principles by which they could 
judicially determine what balance was required for the fair reconcilia-
tion of Aboriginal rights with Crown sovereignty. 
In Nowegijick v. The Queen, the Supreme Court of Canada said that 
"treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed 
and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians."102 This 
means that treaties should be considered in the complete historical and 
legal context in which they were made, which involves consideration of 
extrinsic evidence. 103 Treaties should be given the meaning that the 
parties, particularly the Aboriginals, would have understood them to 
have. Any provisions that restrict the rights of Aboriginal people should 
be narrowly construed104 and the court is not limited to the plain meaning 
of the words in the text. "The honour of the Crown is always at stake in 
its dealings with Aboriginal peoples,"105 and (prior to 1982) a "clear and 
plain" intention is necessary to extinguish treaties. 106 These principles 
have been repeated many times. 107 "Sui generis treaties are derived from 
grants from Aboriginal nations to the imperial Crown," so the principles 
of interpretation "require a justice who is reviewing a challenge to an 
Indian treaty to move into an interpretive consciousness that allows 
alternate views of time, law, and culture." 108 
All of this is based, at least in part, on a foundation of inequality 
between the parties. The interpretative principles are an "attempt to 
overcome the limitation of existing precedent on treaties," 109 which was 
developed in the context of an extreme power imbalance. 
102 [1983] I S.C.R. 29 at 36; 144 D.L.R. (3'd) 193. 
103 G. Christie, "Justifying Principles of Treaty Interpretation" (2000), 26 Queen's L.J. 143, 
online: QL (JOUR); R v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, 177 D.L.R. (4'h) 513 [hereinafter 
Marshall cited to S.C.R.]. 
104 Henderson, supra note 31 at 48. 
105 Ibid. at 80. 
106 Christie, supra note 104 at para. 6 I, on line: QL (JOUR); Calder, supra note 15 at 325. 
107 See for example R. v. Sioui, [1990] I S.C.R. 1025 at para. I I I, 70 D.L.R. (4'h) 427; 
Delgamuukw, supra note I 0 at para. 747; Sparrow, supra note 6 at para. 57; Badger, supra 
note 40 at para. 41; Marshall, supra note 104 at paras. 14, 78. 
108 Henderson, supra note 3 I at 47. 
109 Ibid. at 48. 
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Historically the Crown was in a position to take advantage in a 
number of ways. First, the negotiating situation was one easily sub-
verted by the Crown's representatives to further Crown interests in 
acquiring ten-itory and removing both Aboriginal interests in the land 
and Aboriginal peoples themselves. Second, the situation in Canada 
developed within an evolving historical context marked by a growing 
imbalance between Euro-Canadian settlers and Aboriginal peoples. Fi-
nally, as a result of the historic interaction between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples, a fiduciary relationship developed, one wherein the 
Crown came to exercise immense power in relation to the fundamental 
interests of the Aboriginal peoples. 110 
Because of this foundation of inequality, s.35 has been interpreted to 
require judicial oversight of how to create the appropriate balance 
between the parties. It must be understood that this is fundamentally 
different from rules of interpretation applied in other contexts. The 
ordinary rule of contract interpretation does not apply to agreements 
with Aboriginal people. That is, that 
[i]f the parties have seen fit to put their contractual intentions into 
writing, it must be because they wanted their meaning to be clearly and 
unequivocally established. There should be no room for argument 
about what has been agreed. The written word should make plain 
beyond doubt or question what were the requirements of the contract 
that was entered into by the parties. 111 
Nor is there a principle of deference whereby the comis could 
recognize that the parties are in a better position to do the balancing then 
is the court, as there is for example in judicial review of certain adminis-
trative bodies. 112 This judicial control has been necessary because of the 
vulnerability of Aboriginal people and the potential for exploitation by 
the Crown. 
2. American Principles of Interpretation 
The canons of interpretation for treaties with American Indians are 
very similar to the principles used in Canada. The first rule is that "treaty 
terms are to be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have under-
11° Christie, supra note 104 at para. 88. 
111 G.H.L. Fridman, The Law o.f Contract in Canada, 4'" ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 477. 
112 Union Des Employes De Service Loe 298 v. Bibeau//, [1988] 2 S.C.R. I 048; 95 N.R. 161. 
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stood them and according to the dictates of Justice." 113 This principle is 
justified because treaties must be interpreted "as 'that unlettered people' 
understood it and 'as justice and reason demand ... where power is 
exerted by the strong over those whom they owe care and protection."114 
That is, "[f]rom their very weakness and helplessness there arises the 
duty of protection." 115 Flowing from this is the principle that ambiguities 
are to be resolved in favour of the Indians. 116 In sum, Indian treaties are 
to be liberally construed in favour of the Indians. 117 
The issue of interpretation of modem treaties does not technically 
arise in the United States, since Congress put a stop to treaty making in 
1871. 118 In the U.S., these principles of interpretation are applied prima-
rily to pre-1871 treaties, 119 so the justifications for the principles apply to 
the circumstances that existed before 1871. The language of "weakness 
and helplessness" sheds light on some of the paternalistic values that 
unfortunately underlie what appear to be generous principles of interpre-
tation. "In a certain sense, tum-of-the-century legal thinking was the 
embodiment of colonialism in its most mature form, animated by an 
unquestioned confidence in the superiority of Western Civilization."120 
In certain contexts, protective principles of interpretation are obvi-
ously required to give effect to the spirit of the agreement that was 
actually negotiated. Angela Hoeft cites negotiations with the Chippewas 
as one example: 
[T]he President's relationship to the Chippewa (was) that of a 'good 
father' who would treat them justly, and the Chippewa reciprocated 
the analogy, addressing Dodge as 'my father' and referring to them-
selves as his 'children.' Through their conduct and the concerns they 
113 G.D. Meyers, "Different Sides of the Same Coin: A Comparative View oflndian Hunting 
and Fishing Rights in the United States and Canada" (1991) I 0 UCLA Journal of Environmen-
tal Law and Policy 67 at 87, online: WL (JLR). See also A.R. Hoeft "Coming Full Circle: 
American Indian Treaty Litigation from an International Human Rights Perspective" (1995) 
Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory & Practice 204 at 239. 
114 Meyers, ibid. at 87, citing United States v. Winans. 1988 WL 122410 E.D.Pa., 1988. 
115 S.P. McSloy, "Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21" Century" ( 1993) 
20 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 217 at 246 online: WL (JLR), 
citing United States v. Kagama 118 U.S. 375 ( 1886) at 384-85. 
116 Meyers, supra note 114 at 87. 
117 Meyers, ibid. at 87. See also Hoeft, ibid. 
118 McSloy, supra note 116 at 264. 
119 The principles are also applied to "treaty-like" instruments. Meyers, supra note 114 at 88. 
120 Hoeft, supra note 114 at 256. 
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raised, the Chippewa evidenced an understanding that the relationship 
they were establishing with the United States would be ongoing and 
that, like a 'good father,' the President invited their trust and offered 
them protection. 121 
In later interpretation, ambiguous phrases such as 'during the plea-
sure of the President' were interpreted in favour of the Band as not 
granting the President an unfettered discretion. This kind of interpreta-
tion makes sense in the historical context. 
3. Critique of the Principles of Interpretation 
While on one hand these generous principles of interpretation are 
intended to be a benefit to Aboriginal people, they can also be seen to 
serve a suspect and outdated set of values. In "Reading the Colonizer's 
Mind," Olufemi Taiwo argues that colonization depends on 
"sociocryonics, the frozen preservation of outmoded and moribund 
social fonns." 122 Colonization involves treating the colonized like peren-
nial children and "we do not ordinarily put before children complex 
social rules or expect them in infancy to comprehend the principles that 
enable and justify those rules. We do not hold children responsible for 
many of their actions, and we therefore exclude them from much of 
responsibility discourse." 123 He uses the example of exempting the 
colonized from ordinaiy British Law in order to prevent them gaining 
the benefit of principles such as equality before the law. 124 He concludes 
that sociocryonics 
"deprived Africans of the opportunity to engage critically with their 
own culture for the purposes of moving it along, expunging those 
elements that had outlived their usefulness, keeping in altered forms 
those that remained relevant, and generally borrowing from other 
cultures whenever they felt the need for new forms that their indig-
enous structures lacked. 125 
121 Ibid. at 241. 
122 0. Taiwo, "Reading the Colonizer's Mind: Lord Lugard and the Philosophical Foundations 
of British Colonialism" in S.E. Babbitt & S. Campbell, eds., Racism and Philosophy (Cornell: 
Cornell University Press, 1999) 157 at 159. 
123 Ibid. at 168. 
124 Ibid. at 17 6. 
125 Ibid. at 186. 
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Arguably, the principles of interpretation freeze Aboriginal treaty rights 
in the manner in which they would have been understood in their 
historical and legal context. They are also principles that apply only to 
Aboriginal people and can be seen, for example, as depriving Aboriginal 
people of the full value of the deals they make. 
B.W. Morse points out that focusing only on how things would have 
been understood in the past "tells Aboriginal people that what is relevant 
about them is their past ... It also excludes what may have later become, 
or what may become in the future, integral to the very survival of 
Aboriginal cultures."126 He makes the point in relation to defining Ab-
original rights, but it applies as well to interpreting treaties. Interpreting 
treaties that were intended to define an ongoing relation only in their 
historical context also ignores "the way in which cultures in fact evolve, 
adapt and transform over time." 127 
Even in the American context, where the canons of construction are 
being used to interpret 19111 century treaties, Hoeft calls them "rusting 
canons in a changing world." 128 She argues that trying to figure out how 
the Indians would have understood a treaty requires "'reconstruction' of 
an increasingly distant past,"using an academic version of history that is 
an "institution of the dominant, non-native culture."129 Most impor-
tantly, she is concerned that relying on history "reinforces cultural 
stereotypes by freezing Indians in the past and ignoring the reality of 
who they are today." 130 
Further, Hoeft is concerned about non-natives being the ones to 
interpret treaties and to decide what is in the best interest of the Aborigi-
nal group. She says that "federal solutions have consisted of' answers to 
the wrong questions, for the questions were framed by the wants and 
desires of a western, expansionary society, not by the needs and values 
of tribal communities. "' 131 She concludes that 
One bitter result of this history is that the canons still used to protect 
treaty rights from federal or state encroachment bear the imprint of 
values and assumptions which run contrary to that end. At its heart, the 
126 Morse, supra note 30 at I 031-32. 
127 Ibid. at 1032. 
128 Hoeft, supra note 114 at 249. 
129 Ibid. 
IJ(llbid. 
" 1 Ibid. at 248. 
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colonial paradigm is premised on the colonizer's superiority over the 
colonized. Translated into judicial doctrine, the colonial paradigm 
lends itself to a presumption of Native incompetence and governmen-
tal benevolence: Indian people are presumed incapable of understand-
ing and adapting to the changes imposed by an advanced civilization, 
and federal authorities are presumed capable of assessing Indian needs 
and making decisions in their best interests. The twofold presumption 
of Native incompetence and governmental benevolence continues to 
be present in treaty litigation. 132 
Many of these same issues have been pointed out in the Canadian 
context. It is fine to say that treaties should be considered in their 
complete context, but contexts are "neither static nor neutral; they are 
constantly modified to rationalize changing regimes of European 
thought." 133 It is an extremely difficult task to develop a view ofhist01y 
that is truly mutual, especially when one is attempting to do so using 
potentially biased historical records written in languages that incapable 
of embodying Aboriginal world views. 134 
Gordon Christie, among others, has argued that the application of 
the principles of treaty interpretation has been inconsistent and does not 
always achieve the purposes for which the principles were ostensibly 
developed. In fact, he says, "the principles seem to act to reinforce ... 
vulnerability."135 As an illustration of this inconsistency, he asks 
Did the signatories understand and accept that the treaties could be 
violated at will by the Crown so long as it did so with a clear intent? 
Why would any Aboriginal party have entered into such an absurdly 
weak agreement, surrendering its birthright. . .in exchange for no real 
protection? 136 
These same questions, although with lesser force, could be asked about 
entering into agreements expecting that they can be infringed in accord 
with the Sparrow test. 
As Leonard Rotman points out, "[p]art of the difficulty with the use 
of these principles is that while they are well-known, the reasons for 
132 Ibid. at 254. 
133 Henderson, supra note 31 at 57. 
134Ibid. 
135 Christie, supra note I 04 at para. 96. 
136 Ibid. at para. 64. This criticism is made in the context of pre-1983 extinguishment. 
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their existence are not." 137 Interpreting treaties in favour of Aboriginal 
people was designed as a method to give effect to the true intention of 
the parties, assuming that both paiiies intended to fulfill their prom-
ises, 138 not as a way to undermine that intention. '"Generous' rules of 
interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of after-the-
fact largesse. The special rules are dictated by the special difficulties of 
asce1iaining what in fact was agreed to." 139 Treaties in general are 
different from Aboriginal rights. "Treaties are analogous to contracts, 
albeit of a very solemn and special, public nature. They create enforce-
able obligations based on the mutual consent of the parties." 140 The goal 
should always be to dete1mine the true intentions of the parties. 
A paternalistic system whereby governments and judges determine 
what is best for Aboriginal people does not help to determine the true 
intent of equal parties with equal legal rights. Resolving contractual 
ambiguities in favour of Aboriginal people presumes they are not able to 
say what they mean and mean what they say, as is expected of everyone 
else. The fiduciary doctrine assumes that it is easy to take advantage of 
Aboriginal people and that they always need a special level of protection 
that is otherwise usually afforded to children, people receiving medical 
care, and others in special positions of vulnerability. 141 Surely it cannot 
be assumed that the entire population of Aboriginal people have always 
and will always be in need of this special protection. Where the facts do 
not support the need for protection, applying protective principles is 
simply stereotyping and is not in the long-term interests of Aboriginal 
people. 
4. Application to Modern Treaties 
In Eastmain Band v. Canada (Federal Administrator) in the context 
of the JBNQA, the Federal Comi of Appeal said that: 
137 L.I. Rotman, "Taking Aim at the Canons of Treaty Interpretation in Canadian Aboriginal 
Rights Jurisprudence" ( 1997) 46 N .B. L. Rev. I I at 12. 
138 Henderson, supra note 3 I at 48. 
139 Marshall, supra note 104 at para. 14. 
140 Badger. supra note 40 at para. 76. 
141 Although these are not the only possible applications. The fiduciary doctrine has, for 
example, also been applied in the business context. P.W. Hutchins & D. Schulze "When Do 
Fiduciary Obligations to Aboriginal People Arise?" ( 1995), 59 Sask. L. Rev. 97 at I I 2, on line: 
QL (JOUR). 
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We must be careful, in construing a document as modem as the 197 5 
Agreement, that we do not blindly follow the principles laid down by 
the Supreme Court in analyzing treaties entered into in an earlier era. 
The principle that ambiguities must be construed in favour of the 
Aboriginals rests, in the case of historic treaties, on the unique vulner-
ability of the Aboriginal parties, who were not educated and were 
compelled to negotiate with parties who had a superior bargaining 
position, in languages and with legal concepts which were foreign to 
them and without adequate representation. 
In this case, there was simply no such vulnerability. The Agreement 
is the product of a long and difficult process of negotiation. The benefits 
received and concessions made by the Aboriginal parties were received 
and given freely, after serious thought, in a situation which was, to use 
their counsel's expression, one of 'give and take. ' 142 
This decision has been criticized for overestimating the degree of 
equality between the parties. In 1975 Aboriginal rights remained subject 
to unilateral extinguishment by the federal government, as they were at 
all times prior to receiving constitutional protection in 1982. 143 In their 
strong critique of Eastmain, Hutchins and Schulze point out that the 
situation is not really equal when one party can unilaterally take the 
rights being defined away. "[I]t is not so much the relative positions of 
the parties negotiating the treaty which is determinative. Rather it is the 
legal - and moral - context in which the treaty is negotiated, as well as 
the context established by the treaty instrument which may result in 
legal vulnerability for one of the parties." 144 
5. Application to the Nisga'a Treaty 
Post-1982 the legal and moral context has changed, and the conclu-
sion in Eastmain has become much more compelling. In 1982, the 
Nisga'a gained the bargaining chip of legally enforceable rights that 
were not within the control of the provincial and federal governments. 
Both parties knew that that if an agreement was not reached, the courts 
142 [1993] I F.C. 501 at para. 21, 99 D.L.R. (4'11 ) 16 [hereinafter Eastmain cited to F.C.). A 
similar point was made in R. v. Howard, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 299 at para. 9, 115 D.L.R. (4'11) 312. 
The Supreme Court of Canada said that "[t]he historical context summarized above does not 
provide any basis for concluding that the terms of the 1923 Treaty are ambiguous or that they 
would not have been understood by the Hiawatha signatories ... The 1923 treaty does not raise 
the same concerns as treaties signed in the more distant past." 
143 Badger, supra note 40 at para. 47. 
144 Hutchins & Schulze, supra note 142 at 133. 
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could simply enforce Nisga'a rights regardless of the consequences for 
other levels of government. After Delgamukw, the parties knew that the 
courts were willing to take that step if negotiations were unsuccessful. 
The Nisga'a negotiated with what is perhaps an unprecedented degree of 
equality in terms of knowledge and resources. The negotiations had 
been ongoing since just after the Calder decision in 1973. They had 
experienced negotiators and financial resources. The Agreement is the 
product of a vigorous defence of each party's interests by both parties. In 
this context, significantly more weight should be given to the actual 
agreement of the parties and significantly less to the traditional s.35 
analysis, which is based on inequality between the parties. 
The Agreement itself makes it clear that it is not intended to be 
treated like any other treaty under s.35. For example, "[t]here is no 
presumption that doubtful expressions, terms or provisions in this 
Agreement are to be resolved in favour of any particular party." 145 As 
discussed earlier, the parties included the limitations and justifications 
that they thought were appropriate within the terms of the Agreement, 
rather than leaving that to be dealt with by way of judicial interpretation 
under s.35. In this case, applying the principles of interpretation would 
be a refusal to acknowledge "what in fact was agreed to." 146 
There are also external guides that suggest the parties intended the 
Agreement to be treated differently. The Federal Policy Guide on Ab-
original Self-Government says that Aboriginal self-government may 
change the nature of the Crown's "unique, historic, fiduciary relation-
ship with Aboriginal peoples in Canada. 147 The policy states that: 
In circumstances where Aboriginal groups wish the Crown to have 
certain ongoing obligations, self-government jurisdiction or authority 
will, correspondingly, be limited. In such cases, continuing Crown 
obligations should be clearly defined. There is no justifiable basis for 
the Government to retain fiduciary obligations in relation to subject 
matters over which it has relinquished its control and over which an 
Aboriginal government or institution has, correspondingly, assumed 
control. 148 
145 Agreement, supra note I at c.2, s.57. 
146 Marshall, supra note I 04 at para. 14. 
147Federal Policy Guide, supra note 27. The Nisga'a Agreement was negotiated outside of the 
formal treaty process. Nonetheless, government policy documents serve as a good indication 
of what the government is seeking to achieve through all treaty negotiations. 
148 Ibid. at I 0. 
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Through this Policy Guide, the federal government has expressed its 
intention to relinquish control. This is inconsistent with an intention to 
maintain the "residual power" to pass laws that "may infringe upon 
aboriginal rights."149 That residual power requires that the fiduciary 
obligation be retained in all its force in order to justify such infringe-
ments. It would be ironic indeed if treaties could decrease the Crown's 
responsibilities and consequently make it easier for the Crown to in-
fringe them in a manner consistent with their now reduced fiduciary 
responsibility. Rather, the fiduciaiy responsibility that "evolve[s] as a 
natural consequence both of Aboriginal peoples' changing roles in 
shaping their own lives and communities, and of the Crown's dimin-
ished control and authority in relation to the them" 150 should become a 
tool that can be used to ensure that governments honour the agreements 
they have entered. 
The Federal Policy Guide is not an authoritative source from which 
to determine what effect the Agreement has on the Crown's fiduciary 
obligation. The government cannot wish their fiduciary obligation 
away. But it is an important indicia of what the parties are attempting to 
achieve through negotiations. There is also some academic support for 
the idea that "the Treaty will ... secure a measure of autonomy for the 
Nisga' a, [and therefore] the fiduciary obligations of the federal and 
provincial governments will lessen." 151 The bottom line is that if the 
courts do not allow the parties to achieve their goals, there will be no 
incentive to negotiate, and the purpose of s. 35 and of reconciliation 
through treaty making is undermined. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The underlying theme behind both the Sparrow test for justifying 
infringements of treaty rights, and generous principles of interpretation 
in favour of Aboriginal people, is judicial supervision. The courts will 
determine what kinds of objectives are sufficient to justify the infringe-
ment of a treaty right and what standards the justification must meet. 
149 Campbell supra note 5 at para. 119. 
15° Federal Policy Guide, supra note 27 at I 0. 
151 Sanders, supra note 17 at para. 58. 
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The courts will determine what the parties must have meant, what is 
consistent with the honour of the Crown, and what is in the best interests 
of Aboriginal people. This supervisory role is understandable, indeed 
even necessary, in the context of inherently unequal parties. A neutral 
third party is required to protect the interests of the vulnerable. But as the 
courts have recognized, reconciliation is better served by agreement 
between the parties than by judicially imposed solutions. The corollary 
is that once such reconciliation is achieved, with all the compromises 
and concessions that entails, the court should give effect to the inten-
tions of the parties and intervene as little as possible. 
